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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kristina Quintana pled guilty to one charge of grand theft, one charge of burglary, 
and two counts of grand theft by possession of stolen property. The proceedings for the 
charge of grand theft were held before a different judge at the district court level, but 
both sentencing judges relied on the same presentence investigation report and 
considered each other's sentences as they imposed each of Ms. Quintana's sentences. 
As such, most of the issues on appeal are identical, and so the cases were consolidated 
for purposes of appeal. 
In the first case, for the lone grand theft charge, Ms. Quintana received a unified 
sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed. In the second case, she received a 
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, for the burglary charge, and unified 
sentences of fourteen years, with four years fixed for each of the grand theft by 
possession of stolen property charges. The second grand theft by possession sentence 
was made consecutive to the other two charges, which were concurrent. This resulted 
in an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with eight years fixed, in the second case, 
which was made concurrent with the sentence from the first case. 
Ms. Quintana alleges that her sentences represent an abuse of the district courts' 
sentencing discretion. In particular, she argues that the judge in the second case 
disregarded her mental illnesses as a mitigating factor, despite clear evidence of their 
impact on her. The abuse of discretion is evident when that sentence is compared with 
the first case, where the judge actually mitigated Ms. Quintana's sentence because of 
the role those illnesses played in her actions. Beyond that, Ms. Quintana contends that 
1 
neither judge sufficiently considered several other mitigating factors also present in her 
case. 
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court deprived Ms. Quintana of due process, 
equal protection, and effective assistance of appellate counsel when it denied her 
motion to augment the record with documents explicitly considered by the second 
district court judge. As such, she respectfully requests that appellate counsel be 
provided with access to the requested document and should be allowed the opportunity 
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of 
that review. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the first case, Supreme Court Docket Number 39049, Ada County Case 
No. CR-FE-10-6046 (hereinafter, case number 39049),1 Ms. Quintana was charged with 
one count of grand theft and two counts of grand theft by unauthorized control. 
(39049 R., p.5l In exchange for Ms. Quintana's guilty plea to Count I (grand theft), the 
State agreed to dismiss the two charges of grand theft by unauthorized control. 
(39049 R., p.53.) After Ms. Quintana entered her guilty plea to Count I, the district court 
decided to request a copy of the presentence report prepared in Supreme Court Docket 
Number 39156, Ada County Case Number CR-FE-1 0-21005 (hereinafter, case number 
39156), and also determined that there was no need to supplement that report with 
additional evaluations. (39049 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-9.) However, that district court was 
informed that "Judge Copsey requested additional documentation [in case number 
1 The two cases proceeded simultaneously. This is designated as the first case 
because, chronologically, it was the first case in which a sentence was imposed. 
2 As there are two separate records and two separate transcripts, each is identified by 
reference to the corresponding Supreme Court Docket Number. 
2 
39156] concerning Ms. Quintana and reset sentencing to August 03, 2011 [,] for that 
purpose. Upon completion, that information will [be] provided to this Court and 
Attorneys in this matter." (39049 Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), 
p.3.)3 The prosecutor noted that there was one difference between the PSis, in that the 
police reports relating to case number 39049 had been attached to the PSI provided to 
the district court in that case. (39049 Tr., p.23, Ls.16-20.) 
In case number 39049, the district court reviewed the PSI and concluded: "It is 
clear that there are psychological factors involved with regard to this defendant. ... But 
it is clear to this court that this defendant needs structured programs .... " (39049 
Tr., p.45, Ls.16-25.) In consideration of the role those psychological factors played in 
regard to Ms. Quintana's actions, the district court imposed her sentence, but informed 
her: "I will tell you but for these [psychological] reports it would probably be a five year 
sentence, but I'm going to impose a three-year fixed sentence with an eleven-year 
indeterminate sentence." (39049 Tr., p.46, Ls.3-7; 39049 R., pp.53-55.) Ms. Quintana 
did not file a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 35 (hereinafter, 
Rule 35) in case number 39049. She did, however, timely appeal from the judgment. 
(39049 R., p.60.) 
3 As with the transcripts and records, the two PSis are identified by reference to the 
corresponding Supreme Court Docket Number. 39049 PSI page numbers correspond 
with the page numbers of the electronic file "QuintanaPSl.pdf." 39156 PSI page 
numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file "39156 
State v. Quintana PSl.pdf." Included in these files are the PSI report as well as all the 
documents attached thereto (for example, police reports and addendums to the PSI). 
Although the two electronic files are not identical, differing in length and document 
order, the transcript indicates that both district courts used the same PSI. (39049 
Tr., p.23, Ls.1-13 ("Following the plea it was indicated to the court that Judge Copsey 
ordered a presentence report in another case, and the parties agreed that the court 
could make use of that presentence report in the sentencing in this case. I have now 
received those materials .... I authorized counsel to file any supplemental materials 
which they felt might be appropriate. No supplemental materials have been filed .... ").) 
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In case number 39156, Ms. Quintana was charged with six counts of burglary, six 
counts of grand theft, and six counts of grand theft by possession of stolen property. 
(39156 R., pp.62-63.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Quintana pled guilty to one 
count of burglary and two counts of grand theft by possession of stolen property, and, in 
exchange, the State dismissed the remaining fifteen charges. (39156 R., p.111.) Upon 
reviewing the same PSI as the district court in case number 39049, the district court in 
case 39156 concluded: "This is not a mental health issue. This is someone who is 
trying to avoid the consequences." (39156 Tr., p.45, Ls.22-24.) This district court 
dismissed Ms. Quintana's diagnosed mental illnesses as not worth consideration 
because "while she's bipolar, we have -- I would say half the population at this point is 
bipolar, so -- [sic]," and, "you don't tell [the psychological evaluators] the full extent of 
your criminal activity prior to this. And so as a result, they -- they decide that what this 
was instead was bipolar disorder." (39156 Tr., p.35, Ls. 2-4, p.46, Ls.10-14.) It also 
mentioned that "[t]he prison never even reviews any of the mental health records that 
are provided in the presentence report." (39156 Tr., p.46, Ls.15-19.) It further 
disparaged the value of the provided evaluations because "the psychologist at that time4 
having given Miss Quintana a series of tests -- and I'd just note that most of the 
assessments that she -- that we had here, they don't really do the in-depth testing that 
you do when you have a full psychological evaluation." (39156 Tr., p.38, L.22 - p.39, 
L.2; see also 39156 PSI, pp.41-48 (the evaluation to which the district court referred).) 
After dismissing the information contained in the psychological evaluations, this district 
4 This refers to the evaluation performed on Ms. Quintana when she was seventeen. 
(39156 Tr., p.38, L.15-23.) Ms. Quintana was twenty-three at the time of sentencing. 
(39156 Tr., p.36, L.7.) 
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court proceeded to impose Ms. Quintana's sentence based on its own determination of 
Ms. Quintana's psychological impulses. 
Rather than consider the diagnoses articulated in the psychological reports, the 
district court in case number 39156 determined that Ms. Quintana was simply trying to 
avoid consequences for her actions. (39156 Tr., p.41, Ls.19-20, p.42, L.13, p.45, 
Ls.22-24.) It also decided that Ms. Quintana had victimized her co-defendant, Shantel 
King, because it had also read Ms. King's PSI.5 (39156 Tr., p.40, Ls.6-9.) As a result, it 
imposed a ten-year unified sentence, with four years fixed, on Ms. Quintana for Count I 
(burglary), a fourteen-year unified sentence, with four years fixed, for Count VI (grand 
theft by possession), concurrent with Count I, and a unified sentence of fourteen years, 
with four years fixed, for Count VII (grand theft by possession), consecutive with Counts 
I and VI. (39156 Tr., p.47, L.16 - p.48, L.11.) In the aggregate, Ms. Quintana's 
sentence in case number 39156 was twenty years, with eight years fixed, concurrent 
with the sentence imposed in case number 39049. (39156 Tr., p.48, Ls.11-14; 39156 
R., pp.111-14.) 
Ms. Quintana filed a motion for reconsideration of her sentence pursuant to 
Rule 35 in case number 39156 and requested leave to supplement the motion. 
(39156 R., p.121.) She subsequently filed two addenda to her motion. (39156 
R., pp.124, 130.) They contained numerous letters of support from friends and family 
members.6 (39156 R., pp.125-29, 133-36.) They all expressed their continuing support 
5 Ms. Quintana requested that this document be augmented to the record. (Motion to 
Augment and Suspend Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed 
March 7, 2012.) That request was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court. (Order 
Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, April 4, 2012.) 
6 The letters submitted with the first addendum were also presented to the district court 
at sentencing, and the district court did, in fact, consider them at that time. (39156 
R., p.138.) 
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for Ms. Quintana. For instance, several of the authors offered to do what they could to 
help her rehabilitate. (See 39156 R., pp.125-29, 131-36.) Several also explained the 
extent to which Ms. Quintana's mental illnesses, as well as the prescribed medication, 
affect her. (See 39156 R., pp.125-29.) Ms. Quintana also wrote a letter to the district 
court, explaining that she had already completed all the classes available to her, but 
that she was taking advantage of what programs she could. (39156 R., pp.131-32.) 
She also expressed her remorse, and pleaded for leniency. (39156 R., pp.131-32.) 
A letter from an unidentified friend also talked about Ms. Quintana's efforts to get what 
programming was available through the prison. 7 (R., p.135.) 
The district court, however, denied the Rule 35 motion. (39156 R., p.140.) In 
doing so, it claimed it had considered Ms. Quintana's mental illnesses, but provided no 
further discussion regarding their impact on its decision. (See 39156 R., pp.137-140.) 
Instead, the district court focused on Ms. Quintana's criminal record, the nature of the 
offenses, and an incident where Ms. Quintana had informed the prison staff that she 
was suffering complications to a high-risk pregnancy, which later was discovered to be 
a fabrication. (R., pp.139-140.) Ms. Quintana timely appealed from the judgment in 
case number 39156. (39156 R., p.117.) 
Since the sentences were both based on the same information, contained in the 
PSI originally ordered in case number 39156, the arguments on appeal were going to 
7 This letter evidently continued on subsequent pages, but the additional pages were 
not included in the record. (See 39156 R., 135.) Ms. Quintana attempted to locate the 
remainder of that document and augment the record, but was unsuccessful. (See, e.g., 
Motion to Augment and Suspend Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, 
filed March 7, 2012; Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule, April 4, 2012.) 
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be the same, and so Ms. Quintana moved that the two cases be consolidated on 
appeal. That motion was granted. 
Ms. Quintana presented evidence to both district courts regarding several 
mitigating factors present in her case. First, Ms. Quintana reported being diagnosed 
with several mental health conditions, including bipolar disorder and chronic depression, 
at age thirteen. In addition, the Mesilla Valley Hospital staff diagnosed her with 
oppositional defiant disorder, depression, post traumatic stress disorder (hereinafter, 
PTSD), and polysubstance abuse. (39156 PSI, pp.16.) According to her adoptive 
mother, these issues began to present themselves after Ms. Quintana reported that she 
was raped when she was twelve. (39156 PSI, pp. 9-10.) The Idaho Department of 
Health & Welfare reconfirmed her bipolar diagnosis in 2011, classifying it as bipolar 
disorder type I with psychotic features. 8 Her family and friends reported to the district 
court in case number 39156, pursuant to Ms. Quintana's Rule 35 motion, that when she 
takes her medications, she is a valued and contributing member to society. (39156 
R., pp.125, 126, 12B.) However, these medications also had significant side effects, 
which would have notable impact Ms. Quintana. (39156 R., pp.125, 12B.) In fact, those 
side effects caused her to stop taking those medications. (39156 R., p.12B.) When she 
is not on her medications, Ms. Quintana lacks good judgment and is more susceptible to 
influence from her friends. (39156 R., p.125.) 
8 Bipolar disorder type I is the more severe variety of bipolar disorder, in which mood 
swings between mania and depression constitute drastic variations from normal 
behavior. National Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 
"Bipolar Disorder," pp.4-5 (200B), http://mentalhealth.gov/health/publications/bipolar-
disorder/nimh-bipolar-adults.pdf. These episodes are more drastic and longer in 
duration than those experienced in patients with bipolar disorder type II. Id. They 
may also lead to the need for immediate hospitalization. Id. 
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In regard to the incident with the alleged pregnancy, Ms. Quintana reported to the 
prison medical staff that she was experiencing vomiting and vaginal bleeding, which 
caused her to fear for the success of her pregnancy. (39156 PSI, p.87.) Accordingly, 
she was experiencing considerable emotional distress. (39156 PSI, p.87.) She based 
her belief that she was pregnant on a positive home pregnancy test following an 
incident of domestic battery at the hands of a former spouse. (39156 PSI, p.53.) To 
support her claim, she presented a letter, supposedly from a doctor in New Mexico, 
which purported to confirm the pregnancy. (39156 PSI, p.87.) Upon examination by 
medical personnel, however, it was determined that Ms. Quintana was not pregnant, nor 
had she recently been pregnant. (39156 PSI, p.87.) When confronted about the 
matter, Ms. Quintana admitted to forging the letter from the doctor. (39156 PSI, p.53.) 
On the other hand, Ms. Quintana also accepted responsibility for her actions and 
agreed to pay restitution for the losses associated with all the charges, not just those to 
which she pled guilty. (39156 Tr., p.20, L.23 - p.21, L.7.) The restitution for all those 
charges totaled $11,430.94, a sum for which Ms. Quintana is jointly and severally liable 
with her co-defendant. (39156 Tr., p.20, L.19 - p.21, L.7.) 
Ms. Quintana's appeals challenge both district court judges' consideration of 
these factors as they imposed her sentences. Her appeal in case number 39156 also 
challenges the district court's denial of her Rule 35 motion because it failed to 




1. Whether the district court in case number 39156 abused its discretion when it 
imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with eight years fixed, upon 
Ms. Quintana following her plea of guilty to burglary and grand theft by 
possession of stolen property. 
2. Whether the district court in case number 39156 abused its discretion when it 
denied Ms. Quintana's Rule 35 motion in light of the new evidence she 
presented. 
3. Whether the district court in case number 39049 abused its discretion when it 
imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed, upon 
Ms. Quintana following her plea of guilty to grand theft? 
4. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Quintana due process and equal 
protection when it denied her Motion to Augment with Ms. King's PSI in light of 




The District Court In Case Number 39156 Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed 
An Aggregate Sentence Of Twenty Years, With Eight Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Quintana 
Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Burglary And Grand Theft By Possession Of 
Stolen Property 
A. Introduction 
The district court in case number 39156 insufficiently considered several 
mitigating factors present in Ms. Quintana's case. The most notable of these was 
Ms. Quintana's mental health issues, which this district court declared to be a non-
issue, despite the fact that the district court in case number 39049 had already 
sufficiently considered that same factor and, based on the same information, actually 
reduced Ms. Quintana's sentence because of the role her mental health issues played 
in her actions. By insufficiently considering this and the other mitigating factors, the 
district court in case number 39156 insufficiently considered Idaho's recognized 
sentencing objectives, and so imposed an excessive sentence in an abuse of its 
discretion. 
B. The District Court In Case Number 39156 Did Not Sufficiently Consider 
Ms. Quintana's Diagnosed Mental Health Issues 
Ms. Quintana asserts that, given any view of the facts, the individual sentences, 
as well as the aggregate sentence in case number 39156 of twenty years, with eight 
years fixed, are excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court 
imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent 
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of 
the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 
771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). 
10 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Quintana does not allege that 
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, she must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or sentencing 
objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the primary objective the court should 
consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that 
protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered 
reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because 
the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, 
each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that the appellate court should consider to determine 
whether the objectives are served by a particular sentence. State v. Knighton, 143 
Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good 
character, status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and 
amenability to treatment, and support of family." Id. Insufficient consideration of 
these factors has been the basis for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, 
e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 
204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), 
rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 
11 
595 (1982). In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the court as it crafted Ms. Quintana's sentence, and, as a result, the 
sentence does not serve the sentencing objectives, and is excessive. 
First, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that I.C. § 19-2523 not only 
suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a 
sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573,581 (1999). Ms. Quintana had been 
treated for depression and bipolar disorder for several years. (39156 Tr., p.12, L.22 -
p.13, L.2.) She has also been diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder, depression, 
PTSD, and polysubstance abuse. (39156 PSI, p.16.) The Idaho Department of Health 
& Welfare reconfirmed the diagnosis of bipolar disorder type one with severe psychotic 
features in 2011. (39156 PSI, pp.16, 115.) According to her adoptive mother, these 
conditions began to manifest after Ms. Quintana reported that she was raped. (39156 
PSI, p.9.) 
These issues may have even presented themselves during Ms. Quintana's 
incarceration. For example, she reported to the prison medical clinic complaining of 
complications to an ongoing pregnancy and was experiencing considerable emotional 
distress as a result. (39156 PSI, p.87.) And while medical personnel found no physical 
evidence of an ongoing or recent pregnancy (39156 PSI, p.87), and Ms. Quintana 
admitted forging the doctor's note which supported her claim (39156 PSI, p.53), the 
emotional issues underlying such actions speak to the nature of Ms. Quintana's 
emotional disorders. Furthermore, the district court in case number 39156 pointed out 
that during this same time, Ms. Quintana was seen on video "having a great old time." 
(39156 Tr., p.44, Ls.15-16.) Bipolar disorder is defined as the diversion from emotional 
norms between mania and depression, and such an oscillation between the two 
12 
extremes would be consistent with that condition. See n.8, supra (explaining that these 
different mood episodes, which may include symptoms of both a manic and depressive 
episode, are part of the effects of bipolar disorder).) 
The district court in case number 39156, however, dismissed this mitigating 
factor out of hand. For instance, it declared that "while she's bipolar, we have -- I would 
say half the population at this point is bipolar, so -- [sic]." (39156 Tr., p.35, Ls.3-4.) The 
district court went on: "I don't think this is a mental health issue. I don't think treatment 
is an issue here." (39156 Tr., p.38, Ls.19-21.) Besides the fact that the district court is 
presumably ill-equipped to offer its own opinions as to matters that are within the ken of 
trained medical professionals, the error in the district court's assertions in this regard is 
made clear when its analysis is compared with the other discussion of these same 
issues, based on the same information, in case number 39049. The district court in 
case number 39049 took the time to review the statutory factors and the record in this 
regard. (39049 Tr., ppAO-45.) Upon doing so, it concluded: "It is clear that there are 
psychological factors involved with regard to this defendant .... it is clear to this court 
that this defendant needs structured programs." (39049 Tr., pA5, LS.16-18, 23-25.) As 
a result, it recommended Ms. Quintana's participation in the therapeutic community, as 
well as in any other programs that the prison staff deemed necessary. (39049 Tr., pA7, 
Ls.7-13.) 
The most telling aspect of that district court's consideration of Ms. Quintana's 
mental health issues in case number 39049, however, came during its imposition of 
sentence: "Ms. Quintana, I will tell you but for these [psychological] reports it would 
probably be a five-year sentence, but I'm going to impose a three-year fixed sentence 
with an eleven-year indeterminate sentence." (39049 Tr., pA6, Ls.3-7.) This sentence 
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recognizes the role Ms. Quintana's mental health issues played in her actions, 
considers the impact they will play going forward, provides opportunities for her to 
address them while in custody, and mitigates the sentence accordingly.9 
Instead of engaging in a similar, sufficient consideration of this factor, the district 
court in case number 39156 dismissed Ms. Quintana's mental health issues as a factor 
entirely. (See, e.g., 39156 Tr., p.38, Ls.19-21.) Among its rationales for doing so 
was that "the psychologist at that time [when Ms. Quintana was 17] having given 
Miss Quintana a series of tests -- and I'd just note that most of the assessments that 
she -- that we had here, they don't really do the in-depth testing that you would do when 
you have a full psychological evaluation." (39156 Tr., p.38, L.22 - p.39, L.2; see also 
39156 PSI, pp.41-48 (report to which the district court referred).) The district court 
continued, "while she's bipolar, we have -- I would say half the population at this point is 
bipolar, so -- [sic]," and, "you don't tell [the psychological evaluators] the full extent of 
your criminal activity prior to this. And so as a result, they -- they decide that what this 
was instead was bipolar disorder."l0 (39156 Tr., p.35, Ls. 2-4, p.46, Ls.10-14.) The 
district court actually went so far as to state, "I'll note for the record that the prison will 
9 As the district court in case number 39049 recognized, it could still impose a long 
indeterminate term as part of the sentence, which addresses the other sentencing 
objectives. (See Tr., p.46, 7-10.) However, that sentence correctly considers 
Ms. Quintana's mental health issues and provides her with a rehabilitative opportunity, 
as well as the opportunity to demonstrate her progress when she is potentially released 
on parole. This, therefore, demonstrates what a proper consideration of such a factor 
should be, and by comparison, illustrates how the district court in case number 39156 
failed to sufficiently consider this factor, thus abusing its discretion. 
10 The district court appears to have concluded that the two conditions are mutually 
exclusive (i.e., if a person has a criminal character, she cannot also suffer from bipolar 
disorder), despite the fact that bipolar disorder "causes unusual shifts in mood, energy, 
activity levels, and the ability to carry out day-to-day tasks," not that it causes criminal 
propensities. See n.8, supra. As such, its factual determination that the psychologists 
would misdiagnose Ms. Quintana with bipolar disorder instead of a criminal character is 
clearly erroneous. 
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do additional testing. The prison never even reviews any of the mental health records 
that are provided in the presentence report.,,11 (39156 Tr., p.46, Ls.15-19.) Having 
disparaged the value of these evaluations, the district court proceeded to sentence 
Ms. Quintana based on its own determinations of her psychological motivations. 
Its primary conclusion was that "nobody is making her accountable. There are 
no consequences for this kind of behavior." (39156 Tr., p.39, Ls.15-17, p.41, Ls.19-20.) 
Based on its independent determination in this regard, the district court in case number 
39156 concluded that "[t]his is not a mental health issue. This is someone who is trying 
to avoid the consequences .... Because if you look through here there is a -- there is a 
pattern of stealing, thievery from other people and yet virtually no consequence for that." 
(39156 Tr., p.45, L.22 - p.46, L.4.) This conclusion was made despite the fact that the 
district court in case number 39049 had just imposed a significant sentence as a 
consequence to a similar charge (grand theft), and that judge had properly considered 
Ms. Quintana's mental health conditions in doing so. (39049 Tr., p.46, Ls.3-7.) 
The district court in case number 39156 did not even make recommendations for 
Ms. Quintana to participate in available treatment programs to address her mental 
health issues while she is imprisoned, as the district court in case number 39049 did. 
(Compare 39156 Tr., p.46, L.21 - p.50, L.3 with 39049 Tr., p.47, Ls.7-13.) 
Therefore, this record is replete with evidence of the district court's insufficient 
consideration of Ms. Quintana's mental health condition in case number 39156. As it is 
11 Apart from the interesting perspective that the prison staff would not review such 
records, even if they do perform their own evaluations, this observation does not 
provide any reason for the district court to discount the information in the evaluations 
contained with the presentence report, especially since I.C. § 19-2523 requires the 
district court to consider such information. See I.C. § 19-2523; HoI/on, 132 Idaho 
at 581. In addition, as there is no evidence in the record which supports the district 
court's assertions in this regard, any finding of fact to that end is clearly erroneous. 
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required to consider this factor, the failure to do so should alone cause this Court to 
vacate that sentence and remand for new sentencing. 
C. In Addition To Insufficiently Considering Ms. Quintana's Mental Health Condition, 
The District Court In Case Number 39156 Also Insufficiently Considered Several 
Other Mitigating Factors When It Imposed An Excessive Sentence 
Besides her mental health issues, there were several other mitigating factors in 
Ms. Quintana's case that the district court failed to sufficiently consider. The first was 
the fact that Ms. Quintana experienced a traumatic childhood. See State v. Williamson, 
135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). In Williamson, the Court of Appeals considered the 
defendant's abusive childhood, which served as a precursor to the abuse of various 
narcotic substances and the impact that played on the offense. Id. Ms. Quintana also 
suffered trauma in her childhood, reporting that she had been raped when she was 
twelve years old. (39156 PSI, p.9.) The significance of this event is magnified because, 
according to Ms. Quintana's adoptive mother, it was only after that event that 
Ms. Quintana began lying and engaging in other inappropriate activities, as well as 
manifesting symptoms of her mental illnesses. (39156 PSI, p.10.) This means 
that, even under the district court's skewed perspective of Ms. Quintana's mental health 
condition in case number 39156 (all her actions are a product of lying and other 
negative behavior that were never accompanied by sufficient consequences), the rape 
was the precursor to Ms. Quintana's crimes and thus had an impact on the offense. 
Compare Williamson, 135 Idaho at 620. Therefore, this factor needed to be considered 
in mitigation. This district court, however, did not discuss it at all. (39156 Tr., pp.37-50.) 
This reveals its insufficient consideration of the factors in this case, and thus, its abuse 
of discretion. 
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Additionally, Ms. Quintana possesses several redeeming characteristics, 
regardless of her prior record. Even the habitual criminal will not be subjected to 
excessive sentences. See Carrasco, 114 Idaho 354-55. For example, Ms. Quintana 
accepted responsibility for her actions and agreed to pay restitution for the losses 
alleged in all the charges, not just the ones to which she pled guilty, which totaled 
$11,430.94. 12 (39156 Tr., p.20, L.19 - p.21, L.7.) The willingness to pay restitution, 
in particular, is another factor the district courts should consider in mitigation. 
State v. Richard Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1988). Furthermore, 
acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of responsibility, by the defendant are critical 
first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010), 
rev. denied. By making these acknowledgements, evidenced by her willingness to 
repay all the victims, Ms. Quintana demonstrated that she has taken these critical first 
steps. 
In addition, she had been pursuing advanced education and was slated to 
graduate from the Toni and Guy Hairdressing Academy's cosmetology course in 
November 2010. (39156 Tr., p.17, Ls.6-8; 39156 PSI, p.14.) Finally, Ms. Quintana has 
the ongoing support of her adoptive family. (39156 PSI, p.9; 39156 R., pp.133-34.) 
Family constitutes an important part of a support network, which can help in 
rehabilitation. See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817 (holding that familial support offered to 
affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support offered in 
consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for 
rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration). Therefore, since 
12 Ms. Quintana is jointly and severally liable for this amount with her co-defendant in 
these cases. (39156 Tr., p.21, Ls.3-4.) 
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she has such a support network, she would be more likely to be successful in 
community-based rehabilitation programs, were she timely afforded the opportunity to 
participate in such programs. 
Furthermore, the decision to make some of the sentences consecutive to one 
another so that the total term extends beyond the maximum length permitted for any 
one of the charges,13 given the mitigating factors present in this case, also constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. When reviewing consecutive sentences, the appellate court 
should consider the total aggregate sentence as well as the fixed sentences. 
See Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; State v. Ross, 92 Idaho 709, 718 (1968), disapproved of 
on other grounds by State v. Claudette Half, 95 Idaho 110, 113 (1972). In Alberts, the 
Court of Appeals specifically considered the fact that Mr. Alberts should have been able 
to take advantage of the treatment opportunities available to him in prison with a shorter 
sentence. Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; see also State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 
(1980) (recognizing the same). Similarly, as the district court in case number 39049 
implied, Ms. Quintana should be able to receive effective rehabilitative opportunities 
during a three-year fixed term sentence. (See 39049 Tr., p.46, L.2-10.) Therefore, the 
district court's decision to impose a twenty-year aggregate sentence, and especially, an 
eight-year fixed term, in case number 39156 by running some of the sentences 
consecutive to one another caused Ms. Quintana's sentence to be excessive, just as 
the sentence in Alberts was excessive. 
13 The maximum sentence length for burglary is ten years. I.C. § 18-1403. The 
maximum sentence length for grand theft as Ms. Quintana committed it (see 39156 R., 
pp. 75-76; compare I.C. § 18-2407(1)) is fourteen years, with a mandatory minimum 
prison sentence of one year. I.C. 18-2408(2)(a). Ms. Quintana's aggregate sentence 
was for a unified term of twenty years, with eight years fixed. (39156 Tr., p.48, 11-14.) 
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A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient sentence, 
one aimed at rehabilitation, also addresses all the other objectives - protection of 
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) 
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a 
sentencing court retains jurisdiction, it still imposes and executes a sentence.14 
Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed sentence are still 
present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how 
even a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and 
how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives). Such a sentence 
punishes Ms. Quintana by depriving her not only of her liberty during her period of 
retained jurisdiction, but several of her rights (such as the right to possess a firearm) as 
well, since this is a felony offense. These results, along with the imposed sentence, 
also serve as a deterrent to society at large. See id. Furthermore, it deters 
Ms. Quintana specifically because the sentence need not be suspended should she 
perform poorly or otherwise violate the terms of the rider. Even if she completes the 
rider and is placed on probation, the looming sentence still deters her from violating her 
probation. 
14 Defense counsel in case number 39049 recommended the district court retain 
jurisdiction and permit Ms. Quintana to participate in the rider program. (39049 
Tr., p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.8.) Counsel in case number 39156 did not make any specific 
sentencing recommendations, but did note that the Therapeutic Community program 
should be recommended. (Tr., p.36, Ls.1-4.) In this instance, having a 
recommendation for participation in that rehabilitative program would likely increase her 
chances of actually receiving that treatment. Therefore, as rehabilitation, one of the 
recognized sentencing objectives needs to be sufficiently, the district court's decision in 
case number 39156 to not make that recommendation (and thus insufficiently consider 
that objective) constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
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In this case, the district court does not lose anything in terms of protection of 
society, deterrence, or punishment by retaining jurisdiction. Society receives the same 
protection by retaining jurisdiction as it does by incarcerating Ms. Quintana. She is in 
the custody of the Department of Corrections either way. She cannot harm society 
during that period, so society is protected whether she is on a rider or in prison. 
Furthermore, the district court retains the ability to relinquish jurisdiction and leave 
Ms. Quintana incarcerated for the entire fixed term of the sentence if she does not show 
progress. And if the district court does that, the Parole Board has broad discretion over 
whether to release her on parole during the indeterminate term of her sentence. 
See, e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005). However, the district court could 
relinquish jurisdiction and enforce the prison sentence knowing that all the sentencing 
objectives were properly addressed. 
What the rider does provide that a term sentence does not is the opportunity to 
rehabilitate. As the Idaho Supreme Court has noted, rehabilitation for young offenders, 
like Ms. Quintana, is more likely now than in the future. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 
394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 
(1971). Timing of rehabilitation is an important consideration when addressing that 
objective. See id; State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; 
State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). Therefore, the time to employ 
such an alternative is now. 
The district court in case number 39156, did not even recommend that 
Ms. Quintana participate in any rehabilitative programs during her imprisonment. 
(Compare 39156 Tr., pp.37-50 with 39049 Tr., pA7, Ls.7-13.) In so doing, the district 
court in case number 39156 deprived Ms. Quintana of the opportunity to engage in 
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timely rehabilitation, and thus of effective rehabilitation. As a result, this sentence does 
not serve the sentencing objectives, notably rehabilitation and protection of society, and 
is thus excessive and otherwise represents an abuse of discretion. This Court should 
remedy that abuse. 
II. 
The District Court In Case Number 39156 Abused Its Discretion When It Denied 
Ms. Quintana's Rule 35 Motion In Light Of The New Evidence She Presented 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency 
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). When petitioning for a sentence 
reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show her sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information presented to the sentencing court. Id. "The criteria 
for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in 
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider 
the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were 
altered by the new evidence Ms. Quintana presented. See id.; Huffman, 144 Idaho at 
203. A failure to do so should result in a more lenient sentence. See Cook, 145 Idaho 
at 489-90; Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55; Shideler, 103 
Idaho at 595. 
Ms. Quintana presented the district court with several letters discussing her 
positive character traits and her struggles with her mental conditions. (39156 
R., pp.125-29, 131-36.) Regarding Ms. Quintana's mental conditions, her family and 
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friends reported that when she takes her medications, she is a valued and contributing 
member to society. (39156 R., pp.125, 126, 128.) However, these medications also 
have significant side effects which negatively impact Ms. Quintana. (39156 
R., pp.125, 128.) Those side effects have caused her to stop taking those medications. 
(39156 R., p.128.) When she is not on her medication, she lacks good judgment and is 
more susceptible to influence from her friends. (39156 R., p.125.) Several of the 
authors of these letters also expressed their continuing support for Ms. Quintana, 
offering to do what they could to help her rehabilitate. (See 39156 R., pp.125-29, 
131-36.) Ms. Quintana also wrote the district court a letter, expressing her remorse for 
her actions and explaining her dedication to rehabilitation while in prison. For example, 
she informed the district court that she had earned her GED and was now participating 
in the only programs available to her - Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics 
Anonymous. (39156 R., p.131.) 
The district court, however, denied her motion. (39156 R., p.140.) In doing so, it 
claimed it had considered Ms. Quintana's mental illnesses, but provided no further 
discussion regarding their impact on its decision. (See 39156 R., pp.137-140.) Instead, 
the district court focused on Ms. Quintana's criminal record, the nature of her offenses, 
and the incident where Ms. Quintana had informed the prison staff that she was 
suffering complications to a high-risk pregnancy, which later was discovered to be a 
fabrication. (R., pp.139-140.) As at the original sentencing, the district court in case 
number 39156 did not sufficiently consider, or appreciate, the impact her mental health 
condition had on those events. 
The letters submitted to the district court as part of the Rule 35 motion reveal the 
depth of the impact of Ms. Quintana's mental conditions. First, they reaffirm the fact 
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that the conditions began to present when she reached her teen years. (See, e.g., 
39156 R., p.126.) This was the same time that Ms. Quintana reported her rape (39156 
PSI, pp.9-10.), reaffirming the need to sufficiently consider her traumatic childhood as 
well. See Williamson, 135 Idaho at 620. Second, they reveal the nature of those 
conditions, and thus the need for sufficient consideration of her mental health condition. 
The district court claimed it considered that factor, but given its aversion to that factor at 
the sentencing hearing (see, e.g., 39156 Tr., pA6, Ls.13-14), its single, unsupported, 
unreasoned statement claiming that it now had done so is not encouraging. It certainly 
did not engage in the detailed and sufficient examination of the aspects of this factor 
or the role Ms. Quintana's illnesses played in her actions, unlike its counterpart in 
case number 39049. (Compare 39156 Tr., pA6, LS.13-14 with 39049 Tr., ppAO-45.) 
Ms. Quintana's efforts at rehabilitation also reflect a need to reevaluate her amenability 
to treatment, which is a factor the district court should consider in mitigation, as it affects 
the defendant's potential for effective rehabilitation. See, e.g., Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815. 
Because the district court in case number 39156 did not sufficiently consider 
the mitigating factors and sentencing objectives in light of this new evidence, which 
indicates an increased need to impose a more lenient sentence, one which would afford 
Ms. Quintana the opportunity to participate in programs and then be timely paroled, so 
that she could apply those lessons in a real-world situation, with the help of her support 
network of family and friends, the district court failed to sufficiently consider both the 
factors and the sentencing objectives. Therefore, the decision to deny Ms. Quintana's 
Rule 35 motion constitutes an abuse of discretion that this Court should remedy. 
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III. 
The District Court In Case Number 39049 Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A 
Unified Sentence Of Fourteen Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Quintana 
Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Grand Theft 
While this district court did sufficiently consider Ms. Quintana's mental health 
issues, as described in Section (1)(8), supra, it could have imposed a more lenient 
sentence based on a sufficient consideration of the other mitigating factors present in 
this case, as described in Section (I)(C), supra. 15 (See 39049 Tr., pp.39-48 (wherein 
the only mitigating factor the district court discussed was Ms. Quintana's mental health 
issues).) Thus, because of the insufficient consideration of the mitigating factors 
besides Ms. Quintana's mental health issues, it imposed an excessive sentence in an 
abuse of discretion. 
IV. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Quintana Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied Her Motion To Augment With Ms. King's PSI In Light Of The District 
Court's Express Consideration Of That Information 
A. Introduction 
80th state and federal precedent recognizes that a defendant is entitled to due 
process and equal protection under the law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the federal constitution and Article I, §13 of the Idaho constitution. That precedent also 
recognizes that part of due process and equal protection is providing the defendant with 
an opportunity to defend herself. On appeal, this includes providing the defendant, 
particularly the indigent defendant, with access to a sufficient record. The Idaho 
15 Specifically, these are Ms. Quintana's traumatic childhood, her willingness to pay 
restitution for all charges, her acceptance of responsibility and acknowledgment of guilt, 
her pursuit of advanced education opportunities, and her ongoing familial support. 
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Supreme Court's decision to deny Ms. Quintana's request to augment the record in her 
case with documents that were clearly considered by the district court in case number 
39156 when it imposed her sentence deprived her of that sufficient record, and thus, 
deprived her of due process and equal protection under the law. 
Furthermore, because Ms. Quintana has a statutory right to her direct appeal, 
those constitutional provisions also entitled her to effective assistance of counsel. To 
be effective, counsel needs to be able to make a professional evaluation of the 
questions that might be presented on appeal or consider all the issues that might affect 
the determination in this case. Without access to the requested document, counsel is 
unable to fulfill those expectations. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to 
deny her motion to augment the record with documents that it clearly considered also 
deprived Ms. Quintana of effective assistance of counsel. 
Accordingly, counsel should be provided with access to the requested document 
and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing 
raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
B. By Denying Ms. Quintana's Motion To Augment, The Idaho Supreme Court 
Deprived Her Of Due Process And Equal Protection 
The Idaho Constitution, as well as the federal Constitution, guarantees the 
criminal defendant due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10 CONST., art. I, §13. 
Part of that right is the meaningful opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 
U.S. 545, 552 (1965); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998); State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542, 544 
(Ct. App. 2009). And while Idaho maintains independent interpretation of Article I, §13, 
it will look to the federal interpretations of due process for guidance in that 
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interpretation. State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 128 (2011). As such, Idaho precedent 
has interpreted the two sections as coextensive. Id. 
In order to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and in order to render a 
proper decision in an appellate case, the appellate court needs to "receive and consider 
all papers, records, and files presented to the trial court on the hearing of a contested 
motion. It would be ... a hazardous endeavor for [the appellate court] to rule upon an 
appeal without access to all relevant material used in the hearing below." 
Sheel v. Rinard, 91 Idaho 736, 738 (1967) (emphasis added); I.A.R. Rule 28(c) ("The 
clerk's or agency's record shall also include ... statements or affidavits considered by 
the court or administrative agency in the trial of the action or proceeding) (emphasis 
added); see also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 837-38 (2008) (recognizing the 
defendant has a due process right to review the information considered by the district 
court, and the failure to assert that claim constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel). 
As such, the appellate record needs to include all the information considered by the 
district court in case number 39156, which would include those made in Ms. King's PSI. 
The district court in case number 39156 explicitly stated that it considered 
Ms. King's PSI when it imposed sentence on Ms. Quintana: "We're focusing on victims 
in this case. But as part of that, having read Miss King's presentence report and seeing 
the interaction, I consider Miss King a victim of Miss Quintana." (39156 Tr., pAO, 
Ls.6-9.) Not only did it rely on the information contained in that PSI report, but it used it 
as an aggravating factor in its determination on sentence. Without that document, there 
is no way to determine if its use of Ms. King's PSI is another example of the district 
court's insufficient consideration of the appropriate sentencing factors in case number 
39156. Accordingly, counsel should be provided with access to the requested 
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document and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary 
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
C. By Denying Ms. Quintana's Motion To Augment, The Idaho Supreme Court 
Deprived Her Of Effective Assistance Of Counsel, And Thus, Of Due Process 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides for a right to counsel on appeal for 
indigent defendants. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963). Without the 
assistance of counsel, the appellate process is reduced to "a meaningless rituaL" Id. at 
358. That right inherently demands that such counsel be effective. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387, 397 (1985). 
In order to be effective on appeal, counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief on the client's behalf which presents the best 
arguments available. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that the starting point for evaluating the effectiveness of 
counsel in criminal actions is the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) 
(overruled on other grounds by Card, 121 Idaho at 432.) Those standards establish 
that, to be effective, 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider al/ issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should 
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order to determine whether there 
are issues affecting the validity of the sentence (i.e., indicate that it is excessive), 
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counsel needs to consider all the evidence the district court considered, or else, be 
ineffective. See id. Without being able to examine Ms. King's PSI, counsel is unable to 
consider all the issues which might affect the validity of the sentence or advise 
Ms. Quintana on the probable role that information may play in her appeal. 
As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Ms. Quintana's Motion 
to Augment with Ms. King's PSI deprived her of effective assistance of counsel on her 
appeal, and thus, deprived her of due process. Accordingly, counsel should be 
provided with access to the requested document and should be allowed the opportunity 
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of 
that review. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Quintana respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, she respectfully requests that her case, particularly 
case number 39156, be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
Otherwise, she respectfully requests that counsel be provided with access to 
Ms. King's PSI and that counsel be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary 
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
DATED this 10th day of May, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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